Governance
Community governance for shaping the platform's future.
Overview
Curyo is designed to finalize into a fully decentralized, community-governed system. In finalized deployments, token holders govern protocol parameters on-chain and temporary setup roles are renounced so no privileged admin keys or multisigs remain. Local or pre-finalization environments may still use temporary deployer wiring during setup.
Curyo is a reputation token with no monetary value. It is not sold, has no treasury backing, and is not designed as a financial instrument. Governance power comes from earning reputation through verified participation, not from purchasing tokens. This ensures that governance reflects genuine community contribution rather than financial resources.
Voting Power
Curyo includes built-in governance capabilities with snapshot-based voting. Your voting power equals your cREP balance and is activated automatically — no delegation step required.
Leaderboards
The governance page now opens on your Profile by default. The Leaderboard tab focuses on voting-performance rankings across all time, rolling windows, and the current season.
Your own Profile tab now lives on the governance page, so you can edit the same public profile other curators see and track your balance history plus active stake. /settings now focuses on delegation and notifications.
Proposal Lifecycle
| State | Description |
|---|---|
| Pending | Created. Waiting for voting delay (~1 day / 7,200 blocks). |
| Active | Voting open (~1 week / 50,400 blocks). Cast: For, Against, or Abstain. |
| Queued | Passed. In timelock queue (2 days). |
| Executed | Changes are live. |
Parameters
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Proposal threshold | 100 cREP |
| Voting delay | ~1 day (7,200 blocks) |
| Voting period | ~1 week (50,400 blocks) |
| Quorum | 4% of circulating supply (min 10K cREP) |
| Timelock delay | 2 days |
| Governance lock | 7 days (transfer lock after voting or proposing) |
The proposal threshold is a snapshot eligibility check, not a bonded deposit. In the current governor design, the same voting power can back multiple live proposals as long as it satisfied the threshold at proposal creation time. The 7-day governance lock is a flat transfer restriction that begins when an account proposes or votes; because proposal timing is block-based, that lock can expire before the full voting delay plus voting period ends. Proposal-spam resistance therefore comes primarily from quorum, majority voting, and the timelock, not from per-proposal collateral.
Round Voting Parameters
The following parameters control per-content round-based voting. Core round settings are adjustable via governance proposals through the setConfig() function on the RoundVotingEngine contract. The reveal grace period is updated separately through setRevealGracePeriod().
| Parameter | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Minimum voters | 3 | Minimum revealed votes required before a round becomes eligible to settle. Past-epoch reveal checks may still delay settlement. Rounds that stay below commit quorum within the maximum round duration are cancelled with refunds; rounds that hit commit quorum but miss reveal quorum can finalize as RevealFailed after grace. |
| Epoch duration | 20 minutes | Length of each blind-voting epoch before votes from that epoch can be revealed. |
| Reveal grace period | 1 hour | After each epoch ends, past-epoch votes must be revealed before settlement, unless this grace period has expired. This parameter is configured separately from setConfig(). |
| Max round duration | 7 days | Maximum time before a round expires. Below commit quorum the round is cancelled and refundable. At or above commit quorum, missing reveal quorum after the last reveal grace window can finalize as RevealFailed instead. |
| Max voters | 1,000 | Per-round cap. O(1) resolution enables higher limits without cost concerns. |
| Vote stake | 1–100 cREP | Stake range per vote per round. Capped per Voter ID to limit single-voter influence. |
| Vote cooldown | 24 hours | Time a voter must wait before voting on the same content again after their last vote. |
The 3-voter minimum is a deliberate balance between manipulation resistance and early-stage practicality. With fewer than 3 voters, a single actor could control round outcomes. As the platform grows and rounds naturally attract more voters, governance can increase this threshold to further strengthen agreement quality.
Treasury
The governance treasury is held by the timelock controller and starts with 10M cREP. It grows over time through four main ongoing inflow sources:
- 1% treasury fee — 1% of contested losing pools is sent to the treasury when rounds settle.
- Cancellation fees — voluntary content withdrawals pay a fixed 1 cREP anti-spam fee into the treasury.
- Forfeited submitter deposits — when content is flagged for policy violations or receives unfavorable ratings, the submitter's 10 cREP stake is forfeited to the treasury.
- Forfeited unrevealed votes — unrevealed past-epoch stakes that miss the reveal window are swept to treasury during post-settlement cleanup.
Treasury tokens can only be distributed through governance proposals. Token holders propose allocations, the community votes, and after the timelock delay, the transaction is executed automatically. This ensures transparent, community-controlled distribution of community tokens.
The consensus subsidy reserve is separate from the treasury. It is seeded with 4M cREP at deployment and replenished by 5% of losing pools from two-sided rounds, then used to subsidize one-sided round payouts.
Collusion Prevention
The integrity of Curyo's content curation depends on honest, independent voting. Groups that coordinate to artificially upvote or downvote content undermine the prediction pool system and harm fair curation.
Detection: Community members can monitor voting patterns publicly visible. Suspicious activity — such as coordinated voting from related wallets, vote timing patterns, or unusual stake distributions — can be flagged and analyzed using public data.
Enforcement via governance proposals: When hard evidence of collusion is found, the community can take action through governance:
- Revoke Voter IDs — governance can permanently revoke the Voter IDs of confirmed colluders, removing their ability to vote on the platform.
- Reward whistleblowers — governance is encouraged to allocate cREP from the treasury to reward community members who provide evidence of collusion.
Deterrence: Several protocol features make collusion costly and difficult:
- Identity verification — 1 person = 1 Voter ID via passport verification (Self.xyz).
- Stake caps — maximum 100 cREP per content per round limits single-voter influence.
- Vote cooldowns — 24-hour cooldown prevents rapid re-voting on the same content.
- Permanent revocation — losing your Voter ID is irreversible and eliminates voting ability.
The process follows Curyo's standard governance flow: evidence is submitted, a governance proposal is created, the community votes, and after the timelock delay, the action is executed.